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Medieval Cultures and Modern Crises: 
Agamben’s Troubadours, Angels and Monks 
LUKE SUNDERLAND, DURHAM UNIVERSITY 
 
Giorgio Agamben stands accused of political idleness;
1
 for Antonio Negri, he offers only 
“passive marginal resistance.”2 Indeed Agamben’s focus on non-confrontational resistance is 
unusual in contemporary theoretical work, lying in stark contrast to Negri’s work with 
Michael Hardt, which casts the revolutionary as the full actualization of life.
3
 Agamben holds 
that typical revolutionary moves, which blur the boundaries between legal and illegal 
violence because they wield “constitutive” power (that is, the potential to found a new social 
order), prove ineffective as sovereign power structures have already incorporated such modes 
of resistance in the form of an exception within the system. Instead, Agamben has developed 
a model of “destitutive power,” which seeks to deactivate the machine of power through 
rendering inoperative its oppositions between subject and object, inside and outside, active 
and passive, or useful and useless life. Agamben associates destitutive power with supine 
verbs and the middle voice. It would make the linguistic, biological, political, material and 
social oppositions of power impossible, freeing individuals and potentials (including 
language) from productive uses and recuperating other dimensions of human life. I 
understand Agamben as arguing that, if the capitalist world order seeks to create productive 
subjects, then there lies a radical form of resistance in being inactive and unproductive, in 
study, play and profanity.  
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The resources for developing such a model lie scattered across history. Part of Agamben’s 
originality lies in his contention that the potential of texts from many centuries ago has not 
been exhausted, and that we need to go back far to find ways out of contemporary crises of 
democracy and capitalism. There is revolutionary power in the recuperation of cultures that 
have been forgotten, repressed or pushed to the margins. Agamben, I think, hopes that 
philological scrutiny of cultural objects from the past will pay off by providing new paths to 
resistance and thus to new ontologies, new modes of subjectivity and community. Across his 
work, Agamben suggests that misunderstandings of concepts often come from insufficiently 
deep historicization. He extends Michel Foucault’s work to reveal longer genealogies of 
power, but he also has utopian tendencies, seeing in the past dynamic possibilities that inhere, 
unbeknownst to us, in our present. The potentiality of texts, in particular, can never be fully 
realized in any one interpretation, meaning that texts are not equally readable at all moments 
of history. Perspectives are opened and closed by historical change. For example, Agamben 
speaks of the “secret meeting” between Saint Paul and Walter Benjamin that brings the 
former to its “now of knowability” or “legibility,”4 that is, the lucky encounter of text and 
context that uncovers something long occluded. He draws here on Benjamin’s own idea of 
the “dialectical image”: whereas fascism keeps its subjects in a mythical dream state 
supporting the illusion of continuity and progress, the dialectical image provides a sudden 
explosion or flash awakening historical memory and consciousness, short-circuiting time, and 
providing a path to revolution.
5
 Hence the practice of the montage, which creates new 
constellations of decontextualized materials, can provoke a radical crisis of the present. 
Agamben’s own work might usefully be seen as a montage: though he sees historical works 
as reactions to contemporaneous problems, he also tends to decontextualize them. His books 
have non-linear structures, creating links between otherwise distant materials such that they 
might be read afresh, and bringing out their continuing philosophical power. A detractor 
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might see Agamben as constructing quaint little museums of rarified cultural artefacts, but his 
project amounts to an attempt to gather the lost potentialities of the past – hidden in its “folds 
and shadows,”6 in overlooked ideas, texts or modes of thought, or else in neglected elements 
of famous works – to power new philosophical concepts.  
 
I will argue here for the crucial role that medieval materials play in this project. Agamben 
devotes varied and detailed attention to the Middle Ages, possibly more so than any other 
modern philosopher, an engagement which goes beyond the reading of Bisclavret in Homo 
Sacer, Agamben’s best-known work but just one of a now complete series of books, and only 
one element of Agamben’s broader philosophical system. A continuous dialogue with 
medieval culture takes place across his three successive main foci: language, law and life.
7
 In 
his close readings, Agamben takes methodological inspiration from the medieval 
commentary, and from the erudite notes of nineteenth-century philologists who glossed key 
terms.
8
 Most notably, in the End of the Poem (1996 in Italian; not part of the Homo Sacer 
series), Agamben’s philological intervention brings out the metapoetic dimension of 
troubadour metrical experimentation, allowing him to cast poetry as a confrontation with 
ineffable language itself, beyond the binary of sound and sense. Such a troubling of binary 
oppositions opens the path to a liberating experience of inoperativity – the unproductive use 
of language – and of the messianic “time of the end,” when earthly identities and possessions 
will be renounced. In the Kingdom and the Glory (Homo Sacer II.ii; 2007), Agamben’s 
philological work bears on the term “economy.” Medieval thought about angels provides 
ways of thinking the aporia of contemporary democracy through a genealogy of the tandem 
of “reigning” and “governing.” The angels again inscribe an inoperative, messianic 
dimension: when all earthly activity has ceased, they will continue the “useless” activity of 
praising God, in an unnecessary supplement to his already-complete glory. Finally, the 
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Highest Poverty (Homo Sacer IV.i; 2011) focuses on the monastic movements, especially the 
Franciscan monks and their renunciation of ownership via a reinvention of the idea of “use.” 
The Franciscan movement was oppressed, but it retains for Agamben power as a model for 
alternative communities, and for the emancipatory possibilities of new “forms-of-life.” 
Medieval monks thus provide an exit from entire edifice of the Homo Sacer series, which 
otherwise analysed oppression much more than resistance. I will argue that Agamben’s work 
on troubadour poetry prepared a methodology – combining the close reading of medieval 
texts with the techniques of medievalism – that pays off in the new ontological models of his 
more political works. Conversely, when read in the backwards light cast by the later volumes, 
the analysis of troubadour poetry reveals early elements of a politics of resistance. All this, I 
contend, allows Agamben to bring medieval troubadours, angels and monks to their now of 
legibility, and to unleash their revolutionary potential.  
Poetry, Parody and Inoperativity: The Troubadours 
Agamben has a highly original view of poetry: he sees its principal concern as language 
itself, construing it as a conduit to experiences of time outside time.
9
 The troubadours best 
exemplify this, for Agamben, since they sing to a lady who is just a cipher for language. In 
Agamben’s words, the troubadours tried to grasp “the pure existence of language,”10 or “to 
experience the topos of all topoi, that is, the very taking place of language as originary 
argument.”11 The latter quotation comes from Agamben’s work on negativity, where he 
avoids the most famous troubadour poem about negativity – Guilhem IX’s “Farai un vers de 
dreyt nien” – instead reading a tenso (debate poem) about nothingness opposing Aimeric de 
Peguilhan and Albertet de Sisberon (“Amics Albertz, tenzos soven”). Agamben concludes 
that the poets “experience the event of language as if they were called to speak from nothing 
and to respond to nothing.”12 In his eyes, the troubadour project represents a key stage in the 
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development of western subjectivity – crucial to the history of melancholy13 – and a unique 
moment of metrical experimentation and thematic play, as boundaries between the 
scatological and the spiritual were crossed. But, as Agamben also contends of other historical 
textual traditions, such poetry retains potential today. I see the troubadours as central to 
Agamben’s broader attempt to reconcile philosophy and poetry, to seek the thinking essence 
of poetry and the poetic essence of thought, and to transform the link between language and 
metaphysics. The reading of Arnaut Daniel in The End of the Poem represents Agamben’s 
most developed interest in the troubadours, displaying how seriously he takes them as 
virtuoso stylists (I shall also refer to Profanations and The Time That Remains). Like a good 
medievalist, Agamben is aware of manuscript variation, offering a sustained philological 
intervention. This move, I want to show, encapsulates something fundamental to his method: 
mapping the forgotten etymologies of terms, and thus reopening their semantic range, paves 
the way for new philosophical readings of texts, lifting the deadweight of canonical 
interpretations to reveal lost potentials. 
 
The End of the Poem argues that twin movements towards sense and sound traverse poems: 
these movements cannot be separated, nor can they ever coincide. The poem, for Agamben, is 
this tension, perpetuated through rhythms and patterns, and as a formal structure it thus seems 
unable to finish. Closure, when it comes, is always abrupt and forced.
14
 Here lies Agamben’s 
interest: the end of the poem. Agamben draws on medieval treatises by Nicolò Tobino and 
Dante that define verse in terms of disjunctions between units of sense and units of sound, 
enjambment being the key one, though caesura and rhyme also figure. In poetry, a metrical 
limit can be opposed to a syntactical one, whereas in prose no such opposition is possible 
(EP, 34). The final verse, which cuts off these possibilities, is therefore not really a verse, but 
the moment when the poem transforms into prose. This is a potential crisis – sound might fall 
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into the “abyss” of sense (EP, 113) – but instead, Agamben claims, as the poem collapses 
into silence, language itself is transmitted. Agamben’s formulation here is quite mystical: the 
designation of an ill-defined third space beyond binaries is a frequent move of his, and he 
leaves it as an opening of thought, rather than filling the gap with a new concept. In his later 
political works, the same move will allow for the undoing of power, which Agamben insists, 
works via binaries. 
 
It is worth following closely Agamben’s path from the reglossing of apparently insignificant 
terms to broad contentions about poetry and language. “Corn” (EP, 23–42), which examines 
Arnaut Daniel’s poetry, is divided into sections named after a fivefold version of the levels of 
medieval exegesis: “historia” (the literal level of facts and words), “allegory” (typological 
connections), “tropology” (morals), “anagogy” (prophecy) and “seu sensus mysticus” 
(mystical meaning). An exegetical model thus allows Agamben to move from the 
manuscripts of Arnaut Daniel’s poem to allegorical connections between the lady’s body and 
the poem, next to the moral (poetry should be thought of as essentially graphic), then to the 
timeless truth that poems are tensions between sound and sense, and finally to Dante’s 
beatific vision of the ineffable nature of language. To begin, Agamben quotes the razo (gloss) 
explaining the composition of “Pus Raimons e Truc Malecx,” the sirventes where Arnaut 
intervenes in a debate between Raimon de Durfort and a jester, concerning whether a knight 
called Bernat should oblige a lady – Ayna – asking for a peculiar sexual act. The last lines of 
the poem read: 
Bernatz de Cornes no s’estrilh 
al corn cornar ses gran dozilh 
ab que·l trauc tap el penchenilh: 
pueis poira cornar ses perilh.
15
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[Bernat of Cornes should not strive to horn the horn without a big cork with 
which to plug the hole in the groin: then, he will be able to horn without danger.] 
Agamben quotes a whole series of editorial glosses on corn: scholars noted the regular 
meanings of “horn” or “trumpet,” but argued about whether it here means “anus” or 
“clitoris,” making the action “cornar” difficult to determine (EP, 24–26). Agamben, however, 
takes inspiration from Maria Careri’s leftfield suggestion that corn carries the meaning of “a 
special kind of verse” (EP, 28), thus completely recasting the poem as about poetic technique 
as well as obscene acts. Agamben notes that corn lies close to “bec” (“beak,” connoting “bad 
language”), tying the oral and anal to poetic production: 
Ben l’agr’ops que fos becutz 
e·l becx fos loncx e agutz, 
que·l corns es fers, laitz e pelutz 
 
[He should definitely have a beak and the beak should be long and sharp, since 
the horn is horrible, ugly and hairy] 
Key for Agamben are corn’s meanings of “tip” or “extremity” (EP, 30) and its position at the 
poem’s end, where strands of meaning gather and clash. He claims that Arnaut – famous 
amongst troubadours as the master of the perfect construction – takes part in this lewd debate 
because “corn” as bodily orifice symbolizes “corn” as the poetic rupture of the “unrelated 
rhyme,” that is, the rhyme word whose partner lies in a different stanza (EP, 30). Agamben 
cites the example of Arnaut’s “Si·m fos Amors de joi donar tan larga,” where successive lines 
do not rhyme: the first lines of the stanzas rhyme with each other, the second with the second, 
and so on. Compositional unity is thus maintained across, not within, stanzas. The tornada 
(the final, shorter stanza, the “twist” in the tail) repeats the last two rhyme words: “Arnautz a 
fag e fara loncs atens | qu’atenden fai pros hom richa conquest” [Arnaut has waited, and will 
wait, because by waiting, a wise men makes a fine conquest]. Waiting, it can be argued, thus 
symbolizes the poem’s structure, its delaying of the end.  
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Agamben determinedly rereads Arnaut’s poems as metapoetic reflections. Following certain 
of the poem’s manuscripts, he suggests changing the rendering of a crucial line in Arnaut’s 
“Canso do·ill mot son plan e prim”: from “per que mos jois capduelha” [for that my joy is at 
its peak] to “per que mos cors…” [for that my poem...]. the word “capduelha” is repeated in 
the tornada, stressing that poetry has peaked (EP, 29). “Cors” would normally be read as 
“body” or “heart” – homophonic play between the two figures in many troubadour poems – 
but by adding the third term of corn in his reading of “En breu brizara·l temps braus” and 
“L’aura’amara,” Agamben again incorporates a metapoetic dimension. Most importantly, 
however, Agamben reinterprets Arnaut’s celebrated sestina (sextain) “Lo ferm voler qu’el cor 
intra.” Six stanzas of six verses are followed by a tornada of three verses. In such poems, the 
patterning of the six rhyme words is fundamental: the last rhyming word of a stanza becomes 
the first rhyme of the next, the first line’s end word takes second place in the next stanza, the 
next to last moves into third, and the second to fourth, and so on. In a brilliant reading, 
Agamben contends that this process does not unfurl in a way homologous to chronological 
time, but rather through what he calls “cruciform retrogradation,” an alternation between 
progression and inversion that creates “rhythmic constellations themselves in movement” 
(TR, 81–82). The tornada then returns to certain rhyme words, in a different sequence, 
“simultaneously exposing their singularity along with their secret connectedness,” making the 
poem “a soteriological device” (TR, 82).  The announcement and retrieval of end words 
creates a model of messianic time, that is, neither chronological time or eternity, but the 
transformation that time goes through when it becomes a remnant, “the time of the end, the 
time that the poem takes to come to an end” (TR, 83, his italics). As Agamben says: 
the poem is…an organism or a temporal machine that, from the start, strains 
towards its end. A kind of eschatology occurs within the poem itself. But for the 
more or less brief time that the poem lasts, it has a specific and unmistakable 
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temporality, it has its own time. This is where time, which in the sestina consists 
in repeated and often rhyming end words, comes into play (TR, 79, his italics) 
Agamben notes the symbolic importance of the number six – six days of creation, six ages of 
man – suggesting that the tornada represents the seventh day, the messianic fulfilment of 
time. It remains unclear how far these arguments can be extended. Does the end of the all 
poems have the potential to move us towards the final messianic state, or is this a specific 
property of this sestina? Certainly poetry, as an encounter with language beyond any 
communicative use, might afford us a liberating experience of inoperativity. Agamben does 
not make the connection here, but I think he can be read as hinting at poetry’s potential for 
resistance. 
 
The parodic and obscene dimensions of poetry might also be seen to contain this potential. 
Agamben contends that the rhyme-word is “first of all a paradoxical point of undecidability 
between an eminently asemantic element (consonance) and an essentially semantic element 
(the word)” (EP, 36). Indeed the sestina’s rhyme words invite an obscene reading: “intra” 
connotes penetration; “ongla” (“nail”) here suggests closeness and penetration; “cambra” can 
mean “vagina” and “verga” “penis”; “oncle” connotes illegitimate offspring; and “arma” 
could be “weapon” (as well as “soul”).16 The rhyme words are thus key sites of play, 
profanity and liberation. But Agamben also incorporates troubadour poetry into an argument 
about “parody”: in Greek music, melody was meant to correspond to the rhythms of speech; 
parody represented the breaking of this link, the separation of song from speech and the 
opening of para, a space beside, for prose.
17
 Moving quickly from context to context, as is his 
wont, Agamben derives from this a broader definition, where parody means the renunciation 
of direct representation. In troubadour poetry, love is parodic because the love object, 
unobtainable and unnarratable, cannot be portrayed. Trobar clus (complex, obscure poetry) 
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and metrical preciousness represent parody because they “establish differences of level and 
polarities in language that transform signification into a field of unresolved tensions” (PR, 
46). Agamben cites Arnaut’s obscene sirventes, where spiritual longing sits alongside 
burlesque, cynical and sexual subtexts. In the erudite complexities of troubadour poetry, he 
thus finds assertions of freedom from quotidian, productive uses of language. 
 
In the sestina, the rhyme words contain precisely these polarities, but it is with the term corn 
that the most original dimension of Agamben’s reading emerges. “Cor” appears in the first 
line – “Lo ferm voler qu’el cor m’intra” [the firm desire that enters my heart] – but Agamben 
reglosses it as corn: thus desire enters the poem in Agamben’s reading, again making the 
poem metapoetic. To follow Agamben, Arnaut treats all strophes as corns – that is, as 
requiring completion in other parts of the poem – in a dialectical move that transforms the 
unrelated rhyme into the principle of a higher relation (EP, 31). Apparent imperfection 
becomes a new kind of perfection. Agamben is here, I think, praising Arnaut’s ability to 
integrate an element inimical to structure into a structure; Arnaut’s sestina is thus read as a 
brilliantly-realized example of a poetic technique of non-correspondence, encapsulating 
poetry’s ability to shape an encounter with contradiction. The tension between sound and 
sense has its apex in the corn:  “the unrelated verse, binding itself to its counterpart in the 
following strophe, plays out a superior and, so to speak, silent score” (EP, 33). The linking of 
rhymes into a whole moves the focus from one part of anatomy to a higher, harmonic 
relationship, simultaneously causing a fracture between melodic and strophic, metrical and 
syntactical structures. This sounds very much like dialectical transcendence, a moment when 
we are liberated from tensions and move into an uncertain space. For Agamben, then, Arnaut 
makes the first move in a game leading to Mallarmé, whereby the poem is freed from orality, 
from the linkage of rhymes to the troubadour’s singing voice, becoming essentially graphic: 
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“the new technique inaugurated by Arnaut, which elevates this fracture to the status of 
supreme compositional principle, will then signify such a radical metamorphosis of the body 
of the poem as to justify the tempestuous alchemical fermentation that seems to take place in 
the body of Ayna” (EP, 33). In the smallest details revealed by close reading, Agamben 
locates a transformational moment. 
 
Once he has arrived at an argument, Agamben seems to find evidence for it everywhere, and 
he now turns to Dante and Aquinas for further support of the paradigm whereby language is 
traversed by two forces that move towards one another without ever fully corresponding, 
leaving a remainder. For Aquinas, language exceeds the intellect, which however transcends 
language, whereas for Dante, this chiasmus shapes poetry, as language and intellect 
communicate to each other despite their limitations: a double, synchronous movement 
traverses poetry’s ineffable meanings (EP, 38). Agamben returns to Arnaut’s sirventes in the 
chapter’s epilogue to discuss the mysterious lady, “Ayna.” After another, somewhat fanciful, 
philological investigation, Agamben argues that it means “Aina,” “intelligence.” Her identity 
is found in the corn, the remainder or third space, where comprehension becomes opaque in 
speech and speech is muted in comprehension: “insofar as it bears the corn’s coat of arms, 
her oneiric body is the place offered by the poet to unrelated relation and, almost, to the 
reciprocal catastrophe of sound and sense that defines poetic experience” (EP, 42). Ayna is 
the ultimate senhal (code name for the lady) of the troubadour project, found also in 
Raimbaut d’Aurenga’s “Escotatz, mas no say que s’es,” where the last line of each stanza is 
longer and in prose. Hence Raimbaut’s declaration that he does not know what the poem is: it 
is not a “vers” (poem), “estribot” (a rare verse form) or a “sirventes” (a satirical poem).18 
Agamben decides that Raimbaut’s poem concerns the undecidable relationship between 
poetry and prose (EP, 42), preparing for the final, title essay of the volume, when Agamben 
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argues again that all poetry is an encounter with limits. The end of the poem is “the ultimate 
formal structure perceptible in a poetic text” (EP, 112). Raimbaut’s poem encapsulates the 
irruption of prose at the poem’s end, whereas tornadas, the unnecessary supplement marking 
the end, show poets’ awareness of a crisis “as if for poetry the end implied a catastrophe and 
a loss of identity so irreparable as to demand the deployment of very special metrical and 
semantic means” (EP, 112). There is no final reconciliation of the binary of sound and sense, 
merely a remainder of silence. Where the poem ends we do not find the unsayable, but rather 
the true goal of poetry “to let language finally communicate itself, without remaining unsaid 
in what is said” (EP, 115).  
 
Through careful rereading and ambitious reglossing, Agamben casts the troubadours as a 
foundational moment of poetic experimentation, of parody, obscenity and play, all of which, 
by his lights, reveals a potential still inherent in language. His faith in the power of poetry to 
recreate resistance through metrical play is convincing and refreshing, and the rethinking of 
time in relation to troubadour poetry also provides a model for unleashing the potentiality of 
distant texts. Because time is non-linear, the medieval past is never past. The End of the 
Poem represents Agamben’s most highly developed philological work, and the careful 
tracking of the accretion of layers of meaning of key terms will be a crucial method in his 
later works, as will the ability to move from the tiniest detail about vocabulary to the largest 
philosophical contentions, following the system of medieval allegory. Most crucially, the 
ontology of two forces working in tension and in concert, and the need to seek a third 
inoperative space, beyond, will furnish models for denouncing the workings of political 
systems, and for resistance.  
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Bureaucratic Economies: From the Angels to Modern Corporations 
In The Kingdom and the Glory, Agamben continues Foucault’s genealogy of governance, but 
he rejects Foucault’s model, according to which there was a historical shift from the 
premodern era of sovereignty as power over life and death to modern government as 
biopower, the management of life.
 19
 Arguing instead that the two have always worked in 
tandem, Agamben rewrites the entire history of Christian thought, using theology to explore 
the contradictions of democracy. Carl Schmitt and Ernst Kantorowicz’s arguments about the 
link between dictatorships and Christian acclamations provided key props to Agamben’s 
contentions in Homo Sacer, and in the Kingdom, Agamben now shows that acclaim does not 
die with the decline of fascism, rather changing form. Modern democracy works by 
glorification: in the society of the spectacle, the media shape public opinion and create 
consent, constantly reconstituting a “people” with a “national interest.”  The Christian idea of 
providence also remains, though it too has mutated. Modern nations are obsessed with GDP, 
portraying economic growth as the ultimate good that will provide for all. But whereas 
Agamben’s previous work looked at the top (the sovereigns) and the bottom (homines sacri, 
refugees and other forms of bare life created by sovereignty), his focus here on medieval 
thought about angels – the ultimate intermediaries – allows for a new perspective on the 
mechanisms in the middle. He shows how from the Trinity, two paradigms are derived: 
monotheistic political theology (God’s being, which bequeaths to political philosophy the 
notion of transcendent sovereignty) and divine oikonomia (God’s praxis, which gives us 
biopolitics, the tasks of management and government of life) (KG, 1). The theological-
political paradigm shapes absolutism, whereas democratic government works via the 
economic, but both have both elements: thus there is law and its execution, sovereign power 
and state apparatus, and an invisible hand that guides free individual economic actors. This 
leads to the convincing conclusion that western political thought – including, one might add, 
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Agamben’s own Homo Sacer – errs in reducing government to transcendent, executive 
power: “what our investigation has shown is that the real problem, the central mystery of 
politics is not sovereignty, but government; it is not God, but the angel; it is not the king, but 
ministry; it is not the law, but the police – that is to say, the governmental machine that they 
form and support” (KG, 276, in italics in original). Agamben can be seen as arguing that 
modern concepts of government and management have a long (and theological) heritage, and 
thus, we might say, studying the Middle Ages allows for better diagnosis of modern crises. 
Agamben rereads patristic writings, medieval angelology and medieval ideas about “useless 
kings” as anticipations of the ossification of modern democracies and corporate structures, 
with their endless ranks of middle managers, powerful only insofar as they communicate 
downwards the decisions of superiors. He thus, I want to argue, accounts for the sense of the 
futility of politics that shapes the current historical moment, when power seems unlocatable, 
making targets for acts of resistance impossible to find. 
 
The Kingdom lays the groundwork for these contentions via tracking the accretion of strata of 
signification of the term oikonomia over the centuries. Oikonomia derives from Aristotle’s 
work on the household, a complex unit gathering beasts, free men and slaves. Diverse in its 
composition, the household nonetheless runs according to a unitary ordering principle, 
providing a microcosm for thinking the organization of the natural world and the single arche 
of the cosmos. The army provides another metaphor: the arrangement of the ranks must be in 
concert with the broader military strategy. Crucially, Agamben notes that, for Aristotle, the 
immanence of the good implies taxis (order), but that the good also lies in command; order 
exists because of the commander (KG, 82–84). In rhetoric, the term corresponds to ordering 
of spoken and written elements, whereas in politics, it supports the idea of monarchy as 
unifying principle. In each case, economy denotes coordination, management and 
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organization, yet remains bipolar, both transcendent to and immanent in order. Economy thus 
provides the model for Agamben’s keystone opposition between “reigning” – glory as the 
transcendent form of power, the ceremonial regality and liturgy that incarnate unity – and 
“governing” – the actions taken to stave off the threat of disunity, the corrective interventions 
that maintain order. Agamben thus adds the mystical “supplement” of glory and sovereignty 
to Foucault’s account of social control and the arts of government. But why does power need 
glory?  
 
Agamben’s answer involves tracing economy’s extension into theology. In Paul, the 
Christian community is the house of God, primarily an economy rather than a polity (KG, 
25). The patristic thinkers of the second and third centuries AD then reworked the 
Aristotelian concept to defend the Trinity against heresy. As Agamben has it, Trinitarian 
theology reconciled the three hypostases with the unity of divine substance whilst avoiding 
the introduction of a “political fracture in God” (KG, 13). Arguing against Gnosticism, 
Irenaeus contends that there is a single world, created, contained within, and providentially 
governed, by one God; “economy” describes a divine practice leading to the incarnation of 
Jesus and to human salvation (Eusebius, in turn, sees the distinction between theology and 
economy as corresponding to that between the divinity and the humanity of Jesus). The idea 
of economy wards off the spectres of fragmentation and contradiction by allowing for a God 
that is both transcendent and immanent. Tertullian, refuting the claims of Monarchianism, 
says that monarchy can be administered by legions without ceasing to be monarchy. He thus 
uses a political idea to explain the unity of God: God is one in being, but three in economy 
(KG, 53). The development of oikonomia in Origen and Clement of Alexandria relates it to 
providence, the harmonizing of the contingent actions of individual beings into some 
overarching order, opposed to pagan anarchy. Matters of revelation and history are brought 
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into a “mystery of the economy,” whereas in Paul, there was an “economy of the mystery,” 
the activity of spreading the word about the mysteries of God (KG, 35). Oikonomia took on 
the meaning of exception in the sixth- and seventh-century Byzantine church, where the idea 
of the mystery of God’s action, undertaken to ensure salvation, became the model for 
exceptions from the rigid application of canon law (KG, 49).  
 
What is crucial is that Agamben takes these thinkers seriously as doing philosophical work. 
He does not decontextualize theology – instead showing how successive thinkers brought 
different responses to the same central problems – but rather demonstrates how it has 
repercussions beyond its immediate context, how it remains vital. By showing how 
Trinitarian theology turned to economy to interrelate divine monarchy with divine 
government and arrangement of the world, Agamben can explain how key asymmetries and 
conflicts – the conceptual problems of order and disorder, transcendence and immanence, 
unity and multiplicity, inherited from Aristotle and embedded in the term “economy” when it 
was used to fight heresy – are resolved in Aquinas (KG, 85), who rethought the relationship 
the division between being and praxis in a way that became crucial to western political 
thought. Aristotle had given to the West the model of a transcendent arche separate from 
immanent actions and second causes, which led the Gnostics to posit both a lazy God with no 
involvement in the world and one who intervenes actively. Aquinas rejects both poles, 
shunning the idea of an inoperative God but without making God a puppet master, who 
governs everything, to argue instead that, in nature, things nearly always happen for the 
best,
20
 because providence directs nature towards the good as an end. For Aquinas, 
government consists of two things: the design of government, where God governs all things 
immediately, and its execution, where God governs things by means of others. Singular in 
substance but multiple in his activity, God is a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his 
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pupils, but also gives them the faculty of teaching others. Aquinas thus distinguishes primary 
causes from secondary causes. Secondary causes depend on the primary cause, which founds, 
legitimates, and renders possible the second, whereas the second realizes the first concretely 
in the chain of causes and effects (KG, 141).
 
God created all things immediately, but 
established an order among things, where some depend on others (ST 1, q. 104). For 
Agamben, Aquinas’s “order” is a “signature” that moves concepts to a new field (KG, 87), 
shifting ontology from the category of substance to that of relationships. Order is both the 
relationship between creatures and God, and between creatures amongst themselves. 
Medieval ontology is circular because the order of the world is founded in the transcendent 
unity of God, which is also expressed in the immanent order of creatures (KG, 85–87). As 
Agamben articulates, “order” thus explains and inter-relates things that would otherwise seem 
contradictory; they are unitary but split onto two levels, in a harmonious correlation of 
general laws and specific cases.  
 
Aquinas’s complex, integrative thinking provides Agamben with the resources to argue for 
that government remains unitary, even as it is split across levels. As Agamben convincingly 
shows, the politicization of theological and cosmological questions allowed earthly power to 
draw on this duality: reigning and governing provided models for creation and conservation, 
for constitutive and constituted power. To think this duality, Agamben cites the “useless 
king” (the rex inutilis), exemplified by the wounded Fisher King of Arthurian romance, who 
reigns idly whilst others govern for him. Agamben sees this split as one between the mystical, 
ceremonial character of kings and their more managerial function. The wounded king 
prefigures the modern sovereign who reigns, but has little governmental power. Agamben 
argues that the opposition between reigning and governing gets its first technical, juridical 
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formulation in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century canon law debates about the rex inutilis and 
the papacy’s right to depose earthly sovereigns. For Agamben,  
the sovereign is structurally mehaignié [the term Chrétien de Troyes uses to 
describe the wounded king in the Conte du Graal], in the sense that his dignity is 
measured against the possibility of its uselessness and inefficacy, in a correlation 
in which the rex inutilis legitimates the actual administration that he has always 
already cut off from himself and that, however, formally continues to belong to 
him (KG, 99) 
The useless king is a paradigm that also corresponds to a Christian conception of time: at the 
beginning and end lies a figure of idleness, God being inactive before the creation of the 
world and after its termination. The bifurcation of power leads Agamben to the two swords 
described in Luke (22:38), central to medieval debates about papal plenitude of power and 
imperial power (KG, 100–3). Again Agamben brings a new angle to tired debates: he thinks 
that scholars, by limiting themselves to reconstructing the papal-imperial dispute, missed the 
more important question of power’s originary division. The two swords symbolize spiritual 
and earthly power. Though they are discrete, the earthly sword is contained within the 
spiritual one; conversely, the spiritual sword is perfect but still lacking since its nobility 
makes it unable to enact physical violence. Again, as in the distinction between the useless 
and the effective king, it is the separation of powers that allows for the possibility of 
governing men. There is a slothful, transcendent power, superior to a more active power 
which governs, allowing a middle road between two extremes: that God directly acts in 
everything (making his original act of creation useless) and that God does not directly act in 
anything. Though there is a divine plan, contingencies are allowed for by miracles and acts of 
grace, which constitute God’s actions of government. The distinction between primary and 
secondary causes, between constitutive and constituted power, or between providence and 
fate, makes government a vicarious economy of secondary causes administered by Christ, 
and then by earthly rulers. Agamben, uniquely, sees these concepts as the forgotten history of 
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the modern state, which works on the levels of providence and fate, too, offering a vision of 
the country and a transcendent justification of its political organization, as well as quotidian, 
responsive decision-making. 
 
Central to this vicarious economy are angels, God’s middle managers. In a highly original 
reading, Agamben construes scholastic discussions of angels as elaborate theories of 
hierarchy and bureaucracy. For Aquinas, sacred power is called hierarchy: other hierarchies 
imitate the angelic and appropriate its vocabulary (of offices, ministries, and so on) but also 
provide a model for thinking it. The orders of ecclesiastical functionaries, like angels, are 
distinguished by three tasks: purging, illuminating and perfecting (ST, q. 108). The city too is 
divided into orders charged with the same tasks (KG, 157). The ecclesiastical hierarchy is 
thus sacralised but so, to a lesser extent, are all political hierarchies. There are three angelic 
hierarchies, each with three orders: Seraphims, Cherubims and Thrones, the highest orders, 
participate most actively in God’s glory; the middle orders – Dominations, Virtues, Powers – 
fight transcendental battles; and the lower orders – Principalities, Archangels, Angels – 
intervene on earth. Archangels only intervene at key times in history, whereas the lowest-
ranking angels are humble messengers. Thus the angelic hierarchies contain administrative 
aides but also assistants in God’s contemplative power, winged functionaries who sing the 
liturgy in ecstatic choirs. Glory represents the coincidence of the levels. The complexity of 
this hierarchy testifies to God’s power. As Aquinas says: “that an earthly king should have 
ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his dignity; 
because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence” (ST 1, 
q. 103). Agamben sees Aquinas as obsessed with hierarchy, (KG, 150), and if he is right that 
Aquinas left a decisive legacy for the thinking of power in the West, then it is perhaps this 
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valorization of hierarchy as a good in itself that now makes resistance difficult to justify, or 
even to imagine. 
 
Even the demons are bureaucratically organized, as God’s power manifest in their order. As 
Agamben argues, the devil does what God wants, but not in the way God wants it,
21
 or, in the 
terms of Kingdom, God allows the devil to reign in hell but does not determine how he 
governs. For Aquinas, ministers too are “instruments” (ST 1, q. 112) of God. The vicarious 
ontology of government developed in Kingdom can be better understood by reference to two 
other works by Agamben: in the Use of Bodies, he considers the ethical implications of living 
beings acting as the tools of others,
 22
 and in Opus Dei, he construes the liturgy as a paradigm 
of human activity that does not depend on the subject performing it. The liturgy is performed 
through (not by) the priest, and thus the corrupt priest does not cover his whole flock with 
sin, because they still participate in the liturgy’s effects. Opus Dei contends that Christian 
liturgy opens the path for the modern, nihilistic suspension of ethics by the functionary who 
unthinkingly performs his “duty.” Agamben, I want to suggest, is diagnosing an impasse in 
modern politics: power which is not coercive proves impossible to locate and resist. You can 
discredit a leader politically but another will soon take his or her office. Regardless of which 
party rules, the economic structure of government, with its hierarchy of technocrats, remains. 
Dictatorships have already shown us that a return to transcendent sovereignty does not solve 
the problems of immanent government. In Agamben’s reading, then, Aquinas’s perfect 
heavenly hierarchy thus anticipates the later corruption of all earthly ones. 
 
These are pessimistic results largely. But genealogy should provide more than a map of 
where we are, rather asking what is at stake in conceiving of something in a particular way 
(OD, 91), to order to allow for new conceptions. Although the critique of capitalism is 
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downplayed in Kingdom, I think that there remains some optimism about the possibility of 
recovering the lost meanings of terms such as “economy,” some hope that we might be 
rescued from the contemporary impasse. Agamben seeks the prospect of resistance within the 
Christian model, at the limits of its frame of temporal governance. At the end of the world, 
governing will cease, because humanity can no longer be saved. The action of government 
will continue only in hell, with the demons that punish sinners, and the angels will have 
nothing to do but provide glory, the inoperative state after the last judgment. For Agamben, 
“glory” captured within the economic-governmental machine the inoperativity of divine life – 
associated with the idle final state – and thus allowed for operativity, the human productivity 
that dominates modern political discourse. Seizing back inoperativity therefore provides a 
template for resistance. Crucially, it is poetry, again, that provides the symbol of 
inoperativity, as Agamben returns to Arnaut Daniel’s sestina, casting it as the contemplation 
of the Occitan language, that is, language beyond any use or purpose (KG, 252). The 
inoperative life would entail the rejection of every bios – of every politically-determined life 
– to seek instead a state of contemplation where bios coincides with zoe. The transformative 
potential of inoperativity is only hinted at in Kingdom, and developed partially in the The 
Coming Community, where Agamben outlines a model community without identity, but not 
without economy.
23
 In the Highest Poverty, however, Agamben fully sketches an inoperative 
community. 
Community beyond Economy: The “Form-of-Life” 
Much of Agamben’s writing refers to the idea of a “form-of-life”24 – a life that cannot be 
separated from its form – but only in The Highest Poverty does Agamben depict one.  
The originality of the concept lies in the fact that a “form-of-life” is not life as survival and 
vitality, nor does it entail making life aesthetic. Agamben also shuns the false ideal of 
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“happiness” – whose formulation by medieval political theorist Marsilius of Padua he cites –
because it immediately makes life political.
25
 One inspiration is Guy Debord’s critique of the 
marketing of the “lifestyle,” which alienates humans from their lives,26 but Agamben also 
picks up on a loose thread in Foucault’s work on ancient culture and “the care of the self,” to 
portray life as a work of art without an author.
27
 A form-of-life implies no pre-defined or 
positive identity; it is subjectless, based on self-effacement. Avoiding exclusivity of 
membership and constraints on potentiality, Agamben proposes life as an incessant 
contemplative practice, a life where all acts and processes involve possibilities, not products. 
Communal life, in turn, implies contact between human potentialities that cannot be fully 
realized within a legal, political or economic system. There is no human vocation, task or 
purpose. Rather, the form-of-life implies an inoperative community, where life itself is the 
end and where nothing like bare life can be separated, because life does not start from the 
polis and its disconnection of bios from zoe. Here, Agamben’s thinking parallels that of Jean-
Luc Nancy, who rejects identitarian politics and the myth of a return to a closed, perfect 
community that never in fact existed – ideas which lead to totalitarian horrors – to argue 
instead that community can never be made or produced via a social project (or “work”, hence 
Nancy’s community, like Agamben’s, is “inoperative”).28 Agamben is also reacting, like 
Maurice Blanchot, to the dangers of sovereignty. Yet whereas Blanchot places the ethical 
relation of his “unavowable community” in the interruption of ontology by death, Agamben 
here focuses on repressed possibilities for life, thus also moving away from Homo Sacer’s 
fixation on finitude as the mode of thinking about life.
29
 
 
The stated aim of Highest Poverty is to “construct” a form-of-life by using monastic practices 
and writings philosophically.
30
 Agamben reads the coenobitic movements beginning in the 
fourth century AD as attempts to mould a positive state of exception and to harness the 
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creative possibility of life outside the law. In Homo Sacer, life outside the law connoted 
tyranny, monstrosity and animality; it meant being exposed, deprived of protection, with the 
concentration camps a space outside the law created by the law. But as Leland de la 
Durantaye has argued, Agamben’s thought often makes poison and antidote close.31 Thus 
here the opposite – law turned into life – has emancipatory possibilities. The monastic 
movements sought to shape every aspect of life; on Agamben’s reading, this represents the 
desire to overturn the entire logic of control. The Middle Ages remain a moment in a long 
genealogy of power – because The Highest Poverty ends with the triumph of church 
governmentality over the Franciscan poverty movement – yet they also hold the prospect of a 
different model of human potentiality. Agamben’s work often concerns sovereignty’s 
victims, but here I find the whole outlook much less bleak, because The Highest Poverty 
provides Agamben’s only developed example of resistance, although Melville’s Bartleby, the 
inoperative functionary who “prefers not to” perform his work, perhaps best exemplifies 
resistance to corporate hierarchies.
32
 It might seem surprising that Agamben’s paradigm for 
rebellion is monks, but again, I would argue, his approach involves integrating into the 
history of philosophy elements normally excluded from it, in order to find forgotten resources 
for thought. Agamben sees the monks as offering a more profound form of opposition than 
political violence, which is inevitably repressed when the governmental machine strengthens 
itself by invoking a state of exception. When the state of exception has been generalized, 
merely subverting the law is no good, because the law, in its binary structure, already 
contains the possibility of its own subversion. Agamben instead looks to the medieval past 
for attempts to found communities which are not based on law. He sees early Christian 
communities as charismatic groupings, which later ossified as the church, a legal community. 
Christianity’s potential was thus actualized in one sense, but the potential for another 
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dimension, that of the form-of-life, remains in the foundational documents of monastic 
communities. 
 
The monks shaped all aspects of life, sanctifying it through temporal rhythms. Agamben, in 
an intervention similar to medieval glossing, casts them as operating a more rigorous 
scansion of time than Taylorism (HP, 19). Once more, Agamben avoids tired questions – 
about the contents of monastic laws or their juridical status – to hone in on a philosophically-
powerful element: a mode of living where life and law are indistinguishable, where living 
according to the law and applying the law to a pre-existing life coincide. On his reading, the 
monks did not vow to obey the rule. Rather, they promised their life; they lived obedience. 
Rules were both constitutive and immanent, and penalties for disobedience resembled therapy 
(HP, 31); this medical dimension made them, for Agamben, an art of living rather than a 
legal system. Because the form-of-life concerns modes of being, Agamben can construe the 
monks as offering a profound form of resistance that works both on a transcendent level (of 
concepts) and on an everyday level (of praxis). 
 
Agamben perceives in the monks an ethics and a politics freed from all concepts of duty and 
will, and a model for recuperating play and study as models of community formation (instead 
of application, production and work). In a move that, to my mind, draws on his thinking 
about poetry as a confrontation with language itself, Agamben argues that monastic rules 
were meant to be read, and that saying them therefore equalled executing them. He thus 
collapses any distinction between form and content to contend that orality and writing joined 
law and praxis together, and that monastic life was a non-stop liturgy. Elsewhere, Agamben 
argues that only human thought is potential, exposed to inactivity – the angels’ intellect is 
always at work, and that of animals is natural
33
 – and casts study as an interminable shuttling 
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between bewilderment and lucidity.
34
 It is in this light, I would say, that his arguments about 
the roles of lectio and meditatio (recitation and memory) as constitutive parts of the monastic 
rule make sense. Continuous reading – monks picked up where they left off, starting again 
when they reached the end – can be seen as the monks’ own, circular way of exploring 
human thought as potential. 
 
By the twelfth century, some of the movements’ inventiveness had already been captured by 
the Benedictines, and thus partially brought under church control. But it remained impossible 
to reduce the Christian form-of-life to the obedience of precepts, and the ideas of the 
monastic movements were radicalized by the Franciscans in the thirteenth century. The form-
of-life no longer conformed to the liturgy or to formal rules of conduct: the Franciscans 
instead made the term a technical one, with life the decisive question (HP, 96). As the glosses 
on Francis’s writings by Angela da Clareno and Pierre Jean Olivi show, by following Christ, 
monastic life gave itself, and made itself, entirely form (HP, 105–7). In Homo Sacer, 
Agamben argued that a grammatical example has its denotative content “suspended,” making 
it exceptional;
35
 similarly, for the monks, the life of Christ was both exemplary and 
exceptional. The requirement of poverty, the key element for Francis, also worked via an 
exception. The Franciscans shunned, and made inoperative, ownership and accumulation: 
they believed in “use” rather than “ownership,” reckoning that the things of the world could 
be returned to their original context, without ever being appropriated. Surrounded by 
ownership, the Franciscans showed man’s potential to not-own, and thus produced a refusal 
that can be usefully paralleled to Bartleby’s: the monks “would prefer not to” own.  
 
Agamben again undertakes an impressive philological exercise, this time around the term of 
“use,” rehearsing its definitions in Franciscan monks and theologians including Saint 
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Bonaventure and Bonagratia of Bergamo, Hugh of Digne and William of Ockham, all of 
whom, just like the theologians working on the idea of “economy,” Agamben rightly sees as 
performing subtle philosophical work that remains relevant. The Franciscan movement was 
largely negatively defined, against a regime of ownership, focussing on the right to refuse 
rights. Thus Ockham’s defence of use argues that everyone can use out of necessity, 
distinguishing a natural right to use from a positive right. Whereas the latter takes legal form 
and can be renounced, the former cannot. Ockham adroitly places the monks both inside and 
outside the law, in their own inverted state of exception, where the law applies only in the 
exception. This renders the binary opposition obedience/disobedience redundant and thus, for 
Agamben, undermines the law of the church, which defended an idea of possession versus the 
monks claim to use. The monks’ flight from the world forms a new social contract, “a space 
that escaped the grasp of power and its laws, without entering into conflict with them yet 
rendering them inoperative” (TR, 27). Agamben thus construes the monastic movement as a 
very powerful form of resistance that was not limited to the contestation of the law – that 
would lead only to the law’s refiguring – but rather mobilized life’s potentiality, articulating a 
way of living differently. The Franciscans were, for Agamben, the most theoretically 
ambitious of the monastic movements. Other movements tried to escape economy through 
glory, but the Franciscans refused economy altogether. 
 
The Franciscan movement was crushed, but, I would argue, Agamben sees it as a paradigm, a 
model of community whose conceptual potency remains undiminished, regardless of its 
historical successes and failures. Though Francis structured the movement so as to avoid 
conflict with the church, expressing subordination to clerics, it grew into a threat. The 
movement’s weak spot was its insistence on a juridical definition of “use.” Pope John XXII, 
in his 1322 bull Ad conditorem canonem, refused any distinction between use and property, 
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arguing that the two are indistinguishable where food and drink are concerned because 
ownership and consumption coincide (Agamben, again perceiving long genealogies, casts 
this an anticipation of consumer society: HP, 131). For John, use without right was an animal 
condition, suitable only for prelapsarian mankind. Accusing the Franciscans of heresy, he 
expressed the conventional papal view that the church needed legal property, and that 
obedience was more important than poverty.
36
 Agamben repeats here the critique of the 
Catholic Church he elaborated in Opus Dei: the split between the person of the vicar and his 
function creates an ethical void, with the office more important than the form-of-life (HP, 
116–18). This separation was impossible for the Franciscans, who defined life by poverty. 
However, Agamben argues that their discourse on poverty missed the opportunity to uphold 
the category of “form-of-life” important to earlier monastic movements, thus failing to 
question property radically. Though they revealed that property has no reality outside the 
psychological and the procedural, the Franciscans simply tried to create a space without law, 
leaving everything else unquestioned and unreformed. Nonetheless, Agamben retains one 
argument made by the Franciscans, which has particular potential thanks to its subtle 
conceptualization of use. Francis di Ascoli developed the idea of “bodily use” and becoming: 
consumable goods such as food exist in becoming, and are used as such, without ever being 
possessed as fixed, tangible assets (HP, 132–33). How is it possible, he asks, to “own” 
something susceptible to decay? By thus founding his concept of use in the nature of things 
through time, Francis offered a new ontology, rejecting essence and thus making ownership 
unthinkable. Olivi also made ontological claims when he shifted the question of property onto 
the level of existence (HP, 135). Human life too, we might say, generates no essences, and is 
knowable only by its effects. But could a community like that of the Franciscans be created 
now? In The Use of Bodies, the Franciscans provide a starting point for imagining 
“destitutive” resistance, which would challenge the binary operations of power via 
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renunciations, by giving up worldly identities. The 2008 financial crash constituted another 
“now of knowability” for Franciscan writings, and Alessia Ricciardi rightly suggests that the 
use-ownership distinction is being fought once more, in battles over internet downloads.
37
 
Bonaventure argued that the Franciscans lacked acquisitive mentality and resembled children 
or madmen (HP, 111–12), whereas Bonagratia contended that use pre-exists property, 
mentioning the state of innocence (HP, 113) and animals (HP, 110). If the papal interdiction 
of poverty, which prefigured consumerism, left a legacy in the operative and governmental 
ontology of the West, then the Franciscans can provide a model for resistance to 
consumerism via common use, profanation and destitutive protest. The idea of the multitude 
also ties the monks to modern politics: Agamben draws from Dante the multitude’s position 
as the subject of politics beyond every possible community.
38
 The multitude incarnates 
potentiality, sharing nothing but the fact of existing. Despised by Hobbes as apolitical, given 
to war and disrespectful of contracts, the multitude has been rehabilitated by Paolo Virno, 
who argues that because the multitude is foreign everywhere, it must place its trust in the 
human intellect.
39
 This schema evokes refugees as well as Agamben’s monks; both, in their 
extra- or aterritoriality, provide outlines of the coming political community. Agamben’s 
work, I would conclude, traces the way that we have become human in order to open the 
possibility of new modes of being human, which might involve the messianic, the mocked, 
the homeless, the exiled, the childish, the parodic, the animalistic, or even theological models 
from the premodern period, models that in the eyes of many, we no longer have any need for. 
Rebellion against the prevailing order will only be powerful if it gathers these disparate and 
discredited resources, because in them lies the potential for new ontologies of the human. 
 
One can hardly extract a concise “message” from Agamben’s writings, still less a programme 
for action. His philosophy explores of openings of thought in other philosophers, and leaves 
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openings for thinkers to come. Are we to act like medieval poets, thinkers or monks, and 
what exactly would change if we did? I would suggest that looking at the past allows us to 
diversify our set of paradigms, whereas looking forward entails a dumb wait for something 
transformative. Agamben suggests behaving as if the messiah were already here, reimagining 
human potential following already-existing models and tracing longer histories to recover lost 
potentials, to discover what we could have been, and therefore what we might still be. When 
government has become economy, empty words governing bare life, philosophy can offer 
lines of resistance by shaping new vocabularies and new identities via the recuperation of 
human potentials that modern consumer society oppresses or occludes.
40
 In the contemporary 
state of exception, we urgently need to find a potential for transformation, beginning with 
language, where the operations of power first lie. Hence troubadour poetry, with its parody, 
its reshaping of time and above all its inoperative language, has emancipatory possibilities. 
Agamben’s work provides highly original readings of medieval texts that can help 
medievalists see the texts they work on as part of longer continuities of concern, whereas 
modernists are encouraged to lengthen their models of historicization, rather than seeking the 
roots of modernity in modernity, and to think of medieval materials not just as foundational, 
but as of ongoing relevance and vitality. I hope to have shown how an engagement with 
medieval materials has been vital for Agamben’s own thought. Study and contemplation in 
general can provide routes to new concepts of human life, and thus new resources for 
resistance. Scholarship on the Middle Ages in particular has revolutionary potential because 
it provides better understanding of the nature of modern political and economic structures, 
but perhaps most importantly because connects then and now in surprising ways, interrupting 
the flow of historical progress via disruptive images like troubadours, angels and monks. 
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